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Corporate Governance Compliance and
Discretionary Accruals: New Zealand
Evidence
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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of better compliance with corporate
governance regulation on managerial accruals (discretionary accruals) in New Zealand listed
companies. Unlike previous research of earnings management, Jones model (Jones 1991),
Modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) and Performance Matched
Accruals Model (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005) this research focuses on free cash flow as
a measure of discretionary accruals instead of cash flow from operating activities. Univariate
and multivariate regression analysis was done on 70 New Zealand listed firms over the period
of 2000 - 2007 (inclusive). Results found that better compliance with corporate governance
reduces discretionary accruals implying lower managerial opportunistic behaviour.
Consistent with existing theories and models of discretionary accruals, this research
documents that free cash flow increase managerial discretion by comparing with commonly
used accruals model such as Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched
Accruals Model. This study provides insights to regulators in developing corporate
governance and financial reporting guidelines. It suggests that ‘Comply or Explain’ form of
soft regulation reduces managerial discretion with stock exchange listing. This research uses
a comparative analysis of traditional discretionary accrual measure with free cash flow
approach of discretionary accruals. Moreover, an integration approach of discretionary
accrual measure was never done in New Zealand. 3
Keywords: Corporate Governance Index; Discretionary Accruals; Free Cash Flow;
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow; New Zealand.
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1 Introduction
This paper documents the association between corporate governance compliance and
performance matched free cash flow discretionary accruals. Free cash flow (FCF) is the
accumulation of cash flow from operating and investing activities and includes all cash flows
relating to property, plant and equipment and investment in the balance sheet. It has been
suggested that free cash flow is better matched with earnings (Dechow & Ge, 2006), and
there is a considerable body of literature that defines total accruals as the difference between
net income and cash flow from operating activities (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Xie,
Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003). This traditional approach has been extended by Dechow & Ge
(2006) who define total accruals as the difference between earnings and free cash flow.
Recent research studies have used the free cash flow approach to accruals measurement
(Bukit & Iskandar, 2009).
Opportunities for earnings management are higher with the increase of free cash flow
in business and, in the absence of proper monitoring of management; the risk that money
might be misused by investing in less profitable projects is increased. Research studies on
corporate governance and earnings management suggest that better corporate governance
measures such as having independent directors, supervisory committees (such as the audit
committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee), and quality external audits,
can reduce opportunistic behaviour by management.
Cash flow is an important basis for accrual measurement (Ingram & Lee, 2007). Prior
literature on earnings management focused on identifying and expanding the set of variables
that influence discretionary accruals, using cash flow from operating activities (Leuz, Nanda,
& Wysocki, 2003; McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005;
Siregar & Utama, 2008; Xie, et al., 2003). However, free cash flow has not been considered
when calculating total accruals in previous studies. As stated above, FCF is the combination
of cash flow from operating activities and investing activities, which reflects the impact of
cash spending on fixed assets and investments. Companies operating with high FCF provide
greater opportunities for opportunistic behaviour by management. Therefore it is appropriate
to suggest that FCF better reflects accruals for individual firms.
This paper is different in compare with existing research based on US environment
and contributes in three ways; firstly, New Zealand corporate regulation is comparatively
more flexible than USA where management is strictly monitored, controlled and penalised
for wrong forecast and earnings engineering. Moreover market regulators and the New
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants (NZICA) are more reluctant to identify earnings
management. Secondly, corporate ownership structure in New Zealand tends to concentrate
into fewer shareholders whereas US firms are owned by scattered owners caused more
possibility of earnings management. Finally, monitoring mechanisms such as corporate
governance regulations in New Zealand are ‘comply or explain’ (non-mandatory) in
comparison with US ‘Act based’ regulations.
General findings from prior research indicate that discretionary accruals are affected
by corporate governance factors such as the composition of the board of directors, CEO
duality, the composition of the audit committee, and auditor independence (Bukit & Iskandar,
2009; Klein, 2002, 2003; Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Richardson, et al., 2005;
Romano, 2005; Siregar & Utama, 2008). Firm specific characteristics such as firm size,
leverage and profitability have also been documented as determinants of discretionary
accruals. Companies operating for a long period of time are expected to have improved
corporate governance practices (Fasterling, 2005). Stakeholders, therefore, get the benefits of
better monitoring activities. This paper extends earlier research studies by incorporating
company age and stock exchange listings as determinants of earnings management.
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Furthermore, this paper also argues that a company operating for a long time under listing
status reduces earnings management.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section two presents a literature review of earnings
management and corporate governance. Hypotheses are developed in Section three. Sections
four and five explain the sampling process used and the research methodology followed. In
Section six, univariate and multivariate analyses are discussed, which leads to Section seven,
the conclusion of the paper.
2 Literature Review
The thread of earnings management essentially commenced in 1985 with the publication of
Healy’s research, closely followed by DeAngelo’s research in 1986. Both of them focused on
total accruals and changes in accruals as a measure of discretionary acts by management in
order to manage earnings. Healy (1985) found that accrual policies of managers are related to
bonus incentives in their employment contracts. However, DeAngelo (1986) found sharp
contrast with Healy (1985). Both authors used accrual methodology and each found evidence
of income manipulation in a different setting. DeAngelo calculated non-discretionary
accruals based on lagged total accrual whereas Healy measured earnings based on comparing
means of total accruals scaled by total assets. Neither of these researchers separated out nondiscretionary factors – this first occurred when Jones (1991) used a linear regression
approach and controlled for non-discretionary accrual factors including sales revenue and
property, plant and equipment.
A different approach to earnings management research was introduced by McNicols
and Wilson (1988) who focussed on specific accruals within industry settings. McNicols and
Wilson (1988) modelled earnings management on a single accrual factor, the provision for
bad debts, instead of collective factors of accruals using Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP). Moyer (1990) examined the incentives for commercial bank managers to
adjust accounting measures used by regulators and legislators. Petroni (1992) investigated the
extent to which the biased application of accounting discretion by managers of
property/casualty insurers affects the estimation error in claim loss reserves, finding that
managers of financially weak insurance companies bias estimates of claim loss reserves
downwards relative to financially strong insurers.
The behaviour of earnings around a specified benchmark is another approach to
earnings management research. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) provide evidence that
earnings management occurs in order to avoid reporting decreases in earnings or losses. It has
also been suggested that earnings management occurs in order to report positive profit,
sustain recent performance, and meet analysts’ forecasts, in that order (Degeorge, Patel, &
Zeckhauser, 1999).
Dechow et al. (1995) introduced the Modified Jones Model, which has become one of
the most widely-used models in earnings management research. The Modified Jones Model
includes an adjustment to sales based on the change in the amount of receivables. Whereas
the Jones Model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over revenue in either the
estimation period or the event period, the Modified Jones Model assumes that all changes in
credit sales in the event period result from earnings management (P. M. Dechow, et al.,
1995). The Jones Model focuses on the manipulation of bad debt expenses but underestimates
managed earnings when sales are manipulated. In contrast, the Modified Jones Model
overestimates the magnitude of earnings management (Ronen & Yaari, 2007).
The following five sub-sections survey the relevant literature on regulation and
corporate governance indicators related to earnings management.
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2.1 Regulation and Earnings Management
Regulation is an important determinant of earnings management. Both voluntary and
mandatory regulations increase disclosures to shareholders, reduce information asymmetry,
and managerial discretionary power to manage earnings. Disclosure of information reduces
the cost of capital and provides higher earnings quality (Francis, Nanda, & Olsson, 2008). A
weak legal environment might facilitate opportunistic earnings management, which results in
lower earnings quality. Although soft regulations strengthen the rights of minority
shareholders, they cannot rely on the courts as legal processes remain slow and ineffective
(Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000). They also found that earnings management is inversely
related to the strength of the regulation and litigation environment.
Stock market authorities have become increasingly anxious about the implementation
of corporate governance regulations following many high profile corporate collapses and
accounting manipulations that have occurred in recent years. Corporate governance
regulations were introduced following the Cadbury Report in 1992 (Cadbury, 1992) and,
more recently, tightened in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002, but recent literature suggests that
corporate governance regulations are irrelevant and competing regulators implement them
irrespective of necessity (Romano, 2005). Nonetheless, this flow of regulation allows
regulators to facilitate better policy and allows flexibility to the organisations as one code
does not fit all sectors and companies.
2.2 Board of Directors and Earnings Management
GAAP requires firms to use accrual accounting, but this also allows management to control
the timing of accrual expenditures (Xie, et al., 2003). However, it is over to the board of
directors to monitor and control these discretionary acts of management. Independent outside
directors provide a measure of protection against this agency problem (Weisbach, 1988), so it
is expected that the composition of the board will be a factor that influences the extent to
which a company engages in earnings management since independent outsider directors
monitor management more effectively than inside directors (Vafeas, 2000; Xie, et al., 2003).
Unfortunately, non-executive directors may not act as good monitors if they have a
significant financial interest in the company (Luan & Tang, 2007; Peasnell, Pope, & Young,
2005; Tosi, Shen, & Gentry, 2003), they have other directorships that compete for their time
(i.e. they are too busy), they have limited time to devote to the affairs of the company, or they
owe their positions to existing management and therefore their loyalty is more to that
management than to the company (Hart, 1995). A large board may include a number of
independent directors, but this may also result in greater bureaucracy and less functionality
than a board that is numerically smaller. Nevertheless, a large board with more independent
directors is better positioned to prevent earnings management (Xie, et al., 2003).
2.3 Board Committees and Earnings Management
Vance (1983) argues that the audit committee, the compensation committee and the
nomination committee all have significant influence on corporate activities while Klein
(2003) argues that the overall composition of the board of directors has no influence on firm
performance, but that the audit committee does. It is therefore likely that the structure of
board committees and their composition will impact management’s willingness to manage
earnings. Xie et al. (2003) argue that the executive committee only plays an indirect role
whereas the audit committee has a more direct role in controlling earnings management.

104

Bhuyian et al. | Corporate Governance Compliance

Consequently, an active, well-structured and properly functioning audit committee may be
able to reduce, if not eliminate, earnings management. It is therefore expected that
professionally efficient audit committee members will play a significant role in preventing
earnings management, and that an audit committee comprising a large proportion of
independent directors will ensure effective monitoring. This expectation is in line with the
recommendations of Levitt’s Blue Ribbon Panel (Xie, et al., 2003). The Cadbury Report
(Cadbury, 1992) also suggests that the audit and remuneration committee should be
comprised mainly or entirely of non-executive directors.
2.4 Auditor and Earnings Management
Prior research also shows that auditor and audit quality play an important role regarding the
control of earnings management (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Siregar & Utama, 2008;
Teoh & Wong, 1993). They also argue that the Big 4 auditors have greater independence
from the client as compared to non-Big 4 auditors. Companies audited by Big 4 firms have
less discretionary accruals than others because the auditors play a significant role in
constraining opportunistic earnings management behaviour. However, the auditor’s ability to
be independent is influenced by the incentives they receive, and a recent study has
investigated whether non-audit services compromise auditor independence or whether the
consequences are that the auditor allows pernicious earnings management (Cahan, Emanuel,
Hay, & Wong, 2008; Habib & Islam, 2007).
2.5 Ownership Concentration, Securities Exchange Listing and Earnings Management
Management stockholding reduces agency conflicts because they are both a principal (since
they are shareholders in their own right) and an agent (for the other shareholders). It is
therefore expected that this dual role should result in a lower incidence of earnings
management. Previous studies have found a negative relationship between management
shareholding and the absolute value of abnormal accruals (Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1998).
Healy (1985) found that CEOs tend to manage earnings to maximise their bonus while Klein
(2002) found CEO shareholdings to be no predictor of earnings management. Institutional
ownership provides wider monitoring and greater control of firm information and reduces
earnings management (Hermes, Postma, & Zivkov, 2007; Siregar & Utama, 2008).
3. Hypothesis Development
Five hypotheses are developed in order to test the association between corporate governance
and discretionary accruals.
3.1 Regulations and Earnings Management
The basic premise of capitalism is that individuals pursue their own interest (Smith, 1776).
Appropriate corporate laws and regulations are vital for the efficient working of a capitalistic
economy in order to maximise individual and national wealth. There is a widespread belief
that only strict laws and regulatory controls can prevent management acting for their own
self-interest (Drobietz, 2002). However, an appropriate legal structure may help to protect
investors and their investments, and also ensures a ‘proper’ environment that generates a
return on investment. Corporate governance regulations should lead to improved systems of
internal control within companies. Leuz et al. (2003) examined systematic differences of
earnings management and found a negative relationship between corporate governance
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regulations and the level of earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) argue that insiders have
incentives to conceal their private control benefits from outsiders.
Prior research also found that financial disclosure practices have a positive impact on
investors’ confidence, reduce information asymmetry and result in a lower cost of capital
(Francis, et al., 2008). Similarly, corporate governance and other regulations help
management to structure strong internal control systems and monitor shareholders’ interests.
Tightening rules and regulations and the adoption of self regulation by market participants
are the result of the growing conviction that better corporate governance will deliver higher
shareholder value (Bartle & Vass, 2007; Drobietz, 2002). Increased regulation enhances
strong corporate governance, and together with a more independent and effective board of
directors and board committees, leads to a reduction in managerial discretionary decisions
resulting in earnings manipulation. The first regulation-related hypothesis, expressed in the
null form is therefore:
H 01: There is no relationship between the presence of corporate governance
regulations and discretionary accruals.
3.2 Corporate Governance Compliance and Earnings Management
An effective and efficient board of directors is the prime component in a system of corporate
governance. However, if the board is dominated by executive directors, the opportunity to
indulge in ‘discretionary financial decisions’ will be greater than if the board was dominated
by independent directors. Similarly, CEO duality, where the CEO is also the chair of the
board of directors, creates an environment that enables discretionary decisions concerning the
management of earnings. It is suggested that the use of appropriate board committees such as
an audit committee, remuneration committee, and a nomination committee, will act to reduce
discretionary managerial decisions. For example, having at least one independent director
with financial expertise on the audit committee will enhance the level of corporate
governance, which, in turn, should reduce discretionary accruals. Similar arguments can be
mounted for having independent directors on the remuneration committee (since they will
then be able to rationalise the remuneration and incentives offered to management), and on
the nomination committee (to remove the possibility of nepotistic appointments).
The results of empirical research suggest that outside directors are able to more
effectively monitor and reduce agency costs, which results in lower discretionary accruals
(Jiang, Lee, & Anandarajan, 2008; Klein, 2002; Vance, 1983). Similarly, effective and
independent board committees are expected to monitor internal control systems better. All of
these attributes of best practice generally form part of a robust set of corporate governance
regulations, so compliance with these regulations should strengthen the level of corporate
governance. This leads to the following null hypothesis related to corporate governance
compliance:
H 0 2 : There is no relationship between the level of compliance with corporate
governance regulation and discretionary accruals.
3.3 Control Shareholding and Earnings Management
A zero-based agency cost indicates that the firm is owned by a single owner-manager.
Agency costs exist when ownership is separated from management, i.e. when the manager
holds less than 100 percent of the equity. Agency costs increase with the reduction in the
proportion of managerial ownership. Companies that operate with a controlling shareholder
have less independent decision-making compared to companies where there is no controlling
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shareholder, since the controlling shareholder has access to information and, by definition,
controls the activities and decisions of the board of directors (Varma, Patel, & Naidu, 2009).
Minority shareholders have little or no influence on board decisions, and may feel
insecure when the corporate environment is not regulated. Independent management have
better control over decision-making if the shareholding is scattered amongst many owners.
Therefore, a non-mandatory corporate governance regulatory environment may not be
sufficient to protect minority shareholders. This leads to the following null hypothesis
concerning a controlling shareholder:
H 0 3 : There is no relationship between the presence of a controlling shareholder
and discretionary accruals.
3.4 Business Operation Tenure and Earnings Management
A company operating in society is expected to have a robust system of internal control and to
comply with relevant regulations (Kole & Lehn, 1997). As discussed previously, effective
systems of controlling and monitoring management lead to a reduction in discretionary
accruals. It can be argued that a mature company that has been operating for a period of time
will have such systems in place, and that its stakeholders will be actively monitoring the
financial position of the business. This argument is supported, at least in part, by prior
research which provides evidence that growing and newly established firms have more
discretionary accruals than mature firms (McNichols & Wilson, 1988; Shen & Chih, 2007).
However, all firms, irrespective of maturity, could manage their earnings – for example,
Dechow & Dichev (2002) show that longer operating cycles generate greater uncertainty,
give rise to more estimation errors, and result in lower quality of accruals. Thus the evidence
regarding the relationship between the maturity of the company and earnings management is
mixed. The current research will provide further evidence about this relationship, so the
fourth null hypothesis is as follows:
H 0 4 : There is no relationship between business operating tenure and
discretionary accruals.
3.5 Listing Tenure and Earnings Management
The New Zealand Stock Exchange Listing Rules and the Corporate Governance Best Practice
Code 2004 ("New Zealand Corporate Governance Best Practice Code," 2004) both provide
criteria with which listed companies must or should (respectively) comply. Compliance with
these criteria should result in an environment whereby opportunities for earnings
management will be limited. It is therefore expected that the longer a company has been
listed, the more likely they will have a lower level of discretionary accruals. Hypothesis five,
expressed in the null form, is therefore:
H 0 5 : There is no relationship between the listing tenure of a company and
discretionary accruals.
In essence, this hypothesis posits that a regulated environment of corporate
governance will reduce discretionary accruals by imposing more accountable and effective
monitoring systems.
4 Sample
The sample of companies for this study is selected from companies listed by the New
Zealand Stock Exchange Limited (NZX). The NZX comprises two markets: the New Zealand
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Stock Market (NZSE), the main board where premium equities are traded, and the New
Zealand Alternative Market (NZAX) which lists companies that are comparatively new and,
typically, in a rapid growth phase. The latter market allows these young companies to issue
equities comparatively cheaply as compared to the main board. It should be noted that
corporate governance research in New Zealand has not previously included the NZAX
companies because this board is a recent addition to the market. The inclusion of the NZAX
should therefore add depth to the previous studies of corporate governance in New Zealand.
The sample period covers the years from 2000 to 2007, inclusive. To be included in the
sample, companies must have operated over the entire period of the study. By the end of
August, 2008 a total of 153 companies were listed by NZX. Consistent with previous
research, twenty nine finance companies were excluded since they are subject to different
regulations and reporting procedures. Thirty five companies did not provide a complete set of
financial reports usable for this research while financial information about nineteen
companies was not available.
Corporate governance information such as the composition of the board of directors,
the board committees, and audit information was collected manually from IRG Ltd’s deep
archive section while financial data was collected from DATASTREAM. Company websites
also provided information about operating cycles and the length of time that the company had
been listed on the stock exchange. The final sample of seventy companies was then divided
into different industry sectors using the NZX categories in Table 1, as follows:
Table 1
Sector Composition of Sample
Sector Group
Energy
Goods
Investment
Primary
Property
Service
Total

Companies
8
11
5
9
5
32
70

Observation
64
88
40
72
40
256
560

Percentage
11.43%
15.71%
7.14%
12.86%
7.14%
45.72%
100%

5 Research Methodology
This section describes the research methodology, including the measurement of the research
variables and the statistical techniques and other models used in this research.
5.1 Measurement of Variables
This section describes how the dependent and independent variables were measured and how
discretionary accruals were calculated.
5.1.1 MEASURE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLE
Discretionary accruals were measured using Jones Model (Jones, 1991), the Modified Jones Model
(1995) and the Performance Matched Model (Kothari et al, 2005). Free cash flow was used to measure
the performance matched model as follows:
NDAit
∆REVit − ∆ARit
PPEit
1
= α 0 + α1[
] + β1i [
] + β2[
] + δ 1 ROAit −1 ......(1)
Ait −1
Ait −1
Ait −1
Ait −1
where:
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NDAit (non-discretionary accruals) is divided by Ait −1 (total assets in year t-1 for firm i) (
Total Accruals = Net Income before extraordinary items less Free Cash Flow which includes
cash flow from operating activities and cash flow from investing activities
α0
= constant
∆REVit
= revenue in year t less revenue in year t-1 for firm
∆ARit = receivables in year t less receivables in year t-1 for firm i
PPEit = gross property, plant and equipment in year t for firm i
Ait −1
= total assets in year t-1 for firm i

ε it

= error term in year t for firm i
NDAip = non-discretionary accruals

ROAit −1

= lagged rate of return on assets

5.1.2 MEASURE OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
In this research regulation, corporate governance index, control shareholding, NZX listing
tenure, and operating tenure are independent variables that are explained as follows.
5.1.2.1 Regulation
The regulation effect will be measured by a dummy variable since it is anticipated that
corporate governance regulations will enhance corporate governance compliance and reduce
opportunistic behaviour of management. The opportunistic behaviour of management is
indicated by discretionary accruals, therefore for the years 2000-2003, the regulation dummy
variable will be ‘0’ to indicate the existence of discretionary accruals when there were no
regulations, otherwise the regulation dummy variable will be ‘1’. It is expected that there will
be a negative correlation between the regulation dummy variable and discretionary accruals.
5.1.2.2 Corporate Governance Index
Corporate governance mechanism consists of a complex set of interrelationships so using a
single factor or variable to measure corporate governance is challenging. Researchers tend to
examine the overall impact of a much broader corporate governance mechanism by
formulating a corporate governance index (CGI) and rating systems (Berghe & Levrau, 2004;
Strenger, 2004). In this study, the index accumulates all aspects of corporate governance
including board of directors’ attributes, external auditor, supervisory committees,
management shareholdings, and listing tenure of firms. The index is calculated as:
∑ CVCGit
CGI it =
x100......(2)
∑ MPVCGCit
where:
CGI it
= Corporate governance index for firm i in year t;

CVCG it

= Cumulative value of corporate governance for firm i in year t;

MPVCGCit = Maximum possible value of corporate governance compliance for firm i in
year t;
The corporate governance index is a composite measurement based on dichotomous
variables and actual values measured (Lara, Osmab, & Penalvac, 2007; Larcker &
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Richardson, 2004; Larcker, Richardson, & Irem, 2005). A CGI is prepared using twenty
indicators as follows in Table 2.
Table 2
Measure of Corporate Governance Index
Board of Director Score
No of director
Board Independence
Board Tenure
Busy Board
Board Meeting
CEO duality
CEO Experience

This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the number of directors is not less than
the median, and 0 otherwise.
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the ratio of independent directors is not
less than the median, and 0 otherwise
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the combined tenure (in years) of all
directors in the sample company exceeds the median, otherwise the value is 0.
This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the total outside directorships is greater
than median, otherwise the value is 1.
This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the number of board meetings was
less than the median, otherwise the value is 1.
This variable is assigned the value of 0 where the CEO has this dual role, 1
otherwise.
This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the CEO has not less than the median
number of years of experience and 0 otherwise.

Board Committee Score
No of board committee
Audit committee size
Audit committee financial
expertise
Audit committee meeting
Audit committee
experience
Chair of audit committee
Independent director in
audit committee
Independent director ratio
in nomination committee

Companies that have all three board committees are coded 1, 0 otherwise
This variable is assigned the value of 1 if the audit committee was not smaller
than the median, 0 otherwise
This variable was assigned the value of 1 if the company followed this
recommendation, 0 otherwise.
This variable is assigned the value of 0 if the audit committee met less
frequently than the median and 1 otherwise
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the experience of the audit committee
was not less than the median, and 0 otherwise.
This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the same person was appointed as chair
of both committees, and 1 otherwise.
This variable was assigned a value of 0 if the number of independent directors
on the audit committee is less than the median, and 1 otherwise.
This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the ratio of independent directors on the
audit committee is less than the median, and 1 otherwise.

Audit Score
This variable is therefore assigned a value of 1 if the company is audited by a
‘Big 4’ firm, and 0 otherwise
This variable is therefore assigned a value of 0 if the company is audited by the
Auditor tenure
same auditor for more than five years and 1 otherwise
Ratio of audit fee and non- This variable is assigned a value of 0 if the ratio of fees paid to the auditors is
audit fee
more than the median, and 1 otherwise
Director shareholding and Listing Score
This variable is assigned a value of 1 if the company is also listed on an
Director shareholdings
overseas stock exchange and 0 otherwise
The variable is assigned a value of 0 if the proportion of director shareholding is
Dual listing status
greater than the median, otherwise the value is 1.
Big 4

5.1.2.3 Control Shareholding
If one entity holds at least half of the issued shares, they are considered to have the
controlling shareholding of the company. Companies having a more concentrated ownership
are more likely to have higher discretionary accruals as compared to companies with less
concentrated ownership. The controlling shareholder has access to more information and, by
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definition, can control the company’s governance processes and internal control systems.
This variable will be coded ‘1’ if the company has a controlling shareholder and ‘0’
otherwise. It is expected that there will be a positive relationship between this variable and
discretionary accruals.
5.1.2.4 NZX Listing Tenure
Companies that are listed on the stock exchange are subject to higher monitoring by investors
and regulators. It is expected that all stakeholders would access news releases from the
company as and when they occur, which suggests that it would be more difficult for such
companies to have discretionary accruals. It is posited that the longer a company has been
listed, the less likelihood there will be discretionary accruals. It is expected that there will be
a negative relationship between this variable and discretionary accruals.
5.1.2.5 Operating Tenure
Company operating age and discretionary accruals have an inconclusive relationship. Older
companies are expected to have stable internal control mechanisms which should lead to
lower discretionary accruals. However, a company that is in the early phase of its life is
always likely to have more discretionary accruals than a mature company. Thus it is posited
that as the age of business operation increases the possibility of discretionary accruals
decreases. On the other hand, it can be argued that companies that have been in the market
for a long time may not be too concerned about the reaction of the market to news about the
existence of discretionary accruals. In this case there would be a positive association between
the age of the company and discretionary accruals.
5.1.3 MEASUREMENT OF CONTROL VARIABLES
In this study, leverage, return on assets (ROA), and firm size are considered to be control
variables.
5.1.3.1 Leverage
Leverage indicates business risk in terms of external financing. A company with more
leverage indicates higher debt contribution in terms of its financial structure. A firm that has
higher leverage is more likely to have higher discretionary accruals in order to manage their
external financing and to show a better asset structure with higher revenue performance.
Leverage is therefore considered a control variable in the multivariate equation (Bradbury,
Mak, & Tan, 2006).
5.1.3.2 Return on Assets
Return on assets is the indicator of financial performance of an organisation as it reflects how
effectively and efficiently the resources are being utilised. It is expected that companies with
higher ROA have lower discretionary accruals, and that there will be a negative relationship
with discretionary accruals.
5.1.3.3 Firm Size
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Controlling for firm size is common in earnings management research. It is expected that a
large firm will have relatively higher discretionary accruals compared to a small firm since a
large firm generally will have diversified or decentralised management decision-making. A
diversified decision-making process leads to higher discretionary accruals for business. It is
expected that there is a positive relationship between firm size and discretionary accruals.
5.1.4 SECTOR DUMMY MEASURE
To evaluate the business sector effect, a sector dummy variable was considered to be
relevant. Following the NZX index categories, sample companies are divided into 6 different
sectors to obtain representative samples for each sector. The sectors are: service, primary,
energy, goods, property and investment. while the service sector is used as the intercept for
regression analysis to avoid the dummy variable trap (Gujarati, 2003). Information existing
on the same sector is categorised as ‘1’ and otherwise ‘0’ for sector dummy.
5.2 Multivariate Regression Model
Considering all the above explanatory variables the following general multivariate regression
model is prepared:
DACit = ϕ1 + ϕ 2 Re g _ Dummyit + ϕ 3 CGI it + ϕ 4 (CGI it * Re g _ Dummyit ) +

ϕ 5 ContShrit + ϕ 6 NZXListingTenit + ϕ 7 OperatingTenit + ϕ 8 Leverageit + ϕ 9 ROAit +
15

ϕ10TAit −1 + ϕ11 ∑ Sector _ Dummyit + ξ it ......(3)
11

where:
DACit

Re g _ Dummyit

= Discretionary Accruals (Jones Model, Modified Jones Model,
Performance Matched Model, Performance Matched Free Cash
Flow Model);
= Regulation Dummy;

CGI t

= Corporate Governance Index in year t;

ContShrt

= Control Shareholding in year t;

NZXListTent

= NZX Listing Tenure in year t;

OperatingTen t
Leverage

= Operating Tenure in year t;
= Leverage in year t;

t

ROAt
TAt −1

= Return on Assets in year t;
= Total Assets in year (t-1) as a proxy of firm size;

5

∑ Sector _ Dummy

t

= Sector Dummy for 1, 2 … 5;

1

ϕ
ξ

= Coefficient of respective variables 1, 2 …15;

= Error term.
This model is used for all the measurements of discretionary accruals calculation in
the next section. Discretionary accruals are the dependent variable used to measure
managerial opportunistic behaviour impact on earnings.
6 Results
112

Bhuyian et al. | Corporate Governance Compliance

The objective of this paper was to investigate the effect of corporate governance regulations
on managerial accruals (discretionary accruals) in New Zealand listed companies. First the
results of descriptive statistics are presented then, in the following sections, results of
correlation analysis,; abnormal accruals and multivariate analysis are illustrated.
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
The descriptive statistics for the key variables are presented in Table 3. This table shows a
descriptive analysis pre and post regulation, including the total sample of different variables.
Average discretionary accruals for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, Performance
Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model are close to zero, implying
that the average descriptive statistics of discretionary accruals did not provide any sensible
evidence to conclude. Total accruals were mainly captured by sales and fixed assets like
property plant and equipment scaling. Discretionary accruals are captured on the unexplained
variable of the regression with descriptive statistics evidenced with the value consistent in all
the models of accrual measure. Average corporate governance compliance increased from
0.52 to 0.55 as a result of regulatory impact. The average operating tenure of business is 28
years whereas average listing tenure, significantly less at 12 years, implies that firms take
time to list on the stock exchange after incorporation. The average listing years indicates that
firms listed in the capital market at the growth level of business.
6.2 Correlation Analysis
Correlation analysis is conducted to find the relationship strength among independent and
dependent variables. Table 4, the Correlation Matrix, shows all the models of total accruals
measurement and independent variable relationships. None of the independent variables have
steady unique correlation with discretionary accruals in all models. The Jones model has
significant correlation with the corporate governance index (r = -0.079 at the 10% level) and
return on assets (r = 0.323, at the 1% level). The modified Jones model is correlated with the
same variables as corporate governance index (r = -0.087) with 5% level of significance and
return on assets (r = 0.369) with 1% level of significance. In both cases, the corporate
governance index has a negative relationship with discretionary accruals, indicating that
better corporate governance practice reduces discretionary accruals as a proxy of earnings
management.
Companies’ performance as ROA having a positive relationship with discretionary
accruals indicates that higher performing companies show statistically significant higher
discretionary accruals. McNichols (2000) also claims that Jones and Modified Jones Models
of discretionary accruals have positive relationships with ROA. The performance matched
discretionary accruals model is correlated with business operating tenure (r =-0.108) only.
Finally, the free cash flow discretionary accruals model correlated with the corporate
governance index (r = -0.109), business operating tenure (r = 0.216), leverage (r = -0.124)
and primary sector (r = 0.126) at 5% level of significance. The correlation coefficient is
checked for higher collinearity among regressors. It can be seen from the correlation matrix
that there is no high correlation among variables. As a result, collinearity is no threat to the
independence of regression reported in the following sections.
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Table 3
Descriptive Analysis
Details

Discretionary Accruals – Jones Model
Discretionary Accruals – Modified
Jones Model
Discretionary Accruals – Performance
Matched Model
Discretionary Accruals – Performance
Matched Free Cash Flow Model
Regulation Dummy
Corporate Governance Index (CGI)
CGI * Regulation Dummy
Listing Tenure
Operating Tenure
Return on Assets
Total Assets (t-1)
Primary Sector
Energy Sector
Goods Sector
Property Sector
Investment Sector

PreRegulation
-0.001

Mean
PostRegulation
0.001

All
Sample
0.001

PreRegulation
0.006

Median
PostRegulation
0.019

All
Sample
0.012

-0.005

0.018

0.00648

0.007

0.018

0.0136

0.278

0.140

0.22053

0.001

0.000

0.000

-0.009

0.002

-0.00385

0.196

0.122

0.16268

0.001

0.000

0.000

0.099

0.178

0.141

1.800

1.666

1.733

0.000
0.519
0.000
12.057
28.700
0.058
2706993
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.000
0.554
0.554
16.046
32.707
0.087
1741694
0.157
0.129
0.071
0.114
0.071

0.5
0.536
0.277
14.052
30.704
0.072
2224343
0.079
0.064
0.036
0.057
0.036

0.000
0.500
0.000
8.000
16.000
0.096
120109
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

1.000
0.550
0.550
12.000
20.000
0.100
192802
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.5
0.5
0.15
10
18
0.099
145571.5
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.120
0.000
11.505
34.265
0.426
18895582
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

0.000
0.126
0.126
11.558
34.261
0.321
6008815
0.365
0.335
0.258
0.319
0.258

0.5
0.124
0.291
11.693
34.291
0.377
14016282
0.269
0.245
0.186
0.232
0.186
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Standard Deviation
PrePostAll
Regulation Regulation
Sample
0.268
0.141
0.214

Table 4
Correlation Matrix
Variables

1

2

3

4

Jones Discretionary
1
0.987**
0.745
-0.201*
Accruals (1)
Modified Jones
Discretionary
1
.738** -.191**
Accruals (2)
Performance Matched
Discretionary
1
-.259**
Accruals (3)
Free Cash Flow
Discretionary
1
Accruals (4)
Regulation Dummy
(5)
Corporate Governance
Index (6)
Interaction of CGI and
REGDUMMY (7)
Controlling
Shareholdings (8)
NZX Listing Tenure
(9)
Business Operating
Tenure (10)
Leverage (11)
Return On Assets (12)
Total Assets (13)
Primary Sector (14)
Energy Sector (15)
Goods Sector (16)
Property Sector (17)
Investment Sector
(18)
***
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)
**
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*
Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

0.062

-0.079*

0.051

-.007

0.032

-0.002

-0.028

.323**

0.010

-0.024

0.014

0.017

0.036

-0.012

0.054

-.087*

0.043

-0.016

0.024

0

0.02

.369**

0.01

0.022

0.014

0.017

0.039

-0.004

0.00

-0.026

-0.01

-0.028

0.013

-.108*

0.042

0.005

-0.019

0.039

-0.035

-0.02

-0.036

0.032

0.00

-.109**

-0.032

0.043

0.018

.216**

-.124**

-0.009

0.016

.126**

0.033

0.000

-0.001

0.064

1

.140**

.952**

0.028

.171**

0.058

0.062

0.039

-0.034

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.000

1

.351**

0.005

.119**

.089*

0.002

-.163**

-0.002

-.152**

.116**

-.084*

-.184**

-.171**

1

0.026

.182**

0.072

0.031

0.015

-0.04

-0.026

0.027

-0.01

-0.041

-0.036

1

-.108*

0.021

-.151**

-0.028

.097*

-.089*

-.104*

-.108*

.183**

-.170**

1

.258**

-0.052

-0.045

-.095*

0.063

0.053

-0.004

-0.009

-0.004

1

-.164**

0.043

.112**

-.180**

.214**

-.113**

0.023

-.112**

1

0.021
1

-0.025
0.014
1

-0.056
-.095*
-0.053
1

-0.038
0.067
.160**
-.166**
1

-0.045
0.064
-0.02
-.120**
-.107*
1

.176**
.149**
-0.015
-.155**
-.138**
-.100*
1

-0.012
0.037
-0.027
-.120**
-.107*
-0.077
-.100*
1
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6.3 Abnormal Accruals
This section explains the overall accruals measurement and explanatory power of
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. Three other established accruals measurement
models are also calculated to compare with our model (Performance Matched Free Cash Flow
Model) in explaining coefficients. Table 5 shows the explanatory power of all models.
Table 5
Coefficient of Accruals Model

Models

Jones Model

Adjusted
R2
0.204
(48.861)***
0.201
(48.014)***

Property
Plant and
Equipment
Coefficient

ROA
coefficient

-

-

-

-

0.029
(9.298)***

-0.034
(-2.688)**

0.282
(9.592)***

0.006
(0.239)*

-0.008
(-0.072)

1.709
(6.792)***

Intercept

Total Assets
Reciprocal

Revenue
Coefficient

-922.871
(-8.856)***
-925.144
(-8.859)***

0.03
(8.974)***
0.03
(8.840)***

0.019
(1.803)**
0.02
(1.880)**

Modified
Jones Model
Performance
0.025
-859.579
0.316
Matched
(1.846)*
(-8.578)***
(65.429)***
Model
Performance
-0.355
-8762.579
Matched Free
0.228
Cash Flow
(42.193)*** (-3.121)** (-10.223)***
Model
* Correlation significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed)
** Correlation significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)
*** Correlation significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Table 5 shows that the Jones Model (1991) and Modified Jones Model (1995) both have
almost 20% explanatory power at the 1% significant level. Moreover, all the determinants are
statistically significant as total assets reciprocals and revenue coefficients. The Performance
Matched Model (2005) has 31.6% explanatory power at 1% level of significance. The
determinants of the performance matched model; total assets reciprocal, revenue coefficient,
property plant and equipment coefficient and ROA coefficients are statistically significant.
Finally, the performance matched free cash flow model has 22.8% explanatory power with
1% level of significance. Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model determinants such as
total assets reciprocal, revenue coefficient and ROA coefficient, are statistically significant,
except property plant and equipment that is significant at more than the 10% level.
Table 6 shows the signs of regression for each of the variables in all models. Following
basic accrual measurement process, revenue and fixed assets measurement is the key to
calculating non-discretionary accruals. The coefficient of change in sales is positive because
the sales of a profitable firm exceed its expenses and the net working capital will be positive
if the credit policies of the firm and suppliers are similar. Conversely the coefficient on
property, plant and equipment is negative because it determines the depreciation expenses
(Ronen & Yaari, 2007).
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Table6
Regressor’s Sign & Coefficients on each of the Model and Variables

Details

Total
Accruals
Reciprocals of
Assets
Coefficient
Revenue &
Receivables
Coefficient
Property,
Plant and
Equipment
Coefficient
Performance
Indicator
(ROA)
coefficient

Jones Model

Modified Jones
Model

Performance
Matched
Model

Performance
Matched Free
Cash Flow
Model

+/-

(Positive: 222;
Negative: 338)

(Positive: 218;
Negative: 342)

(Positive: 219;
Negative: 341)

(Positive: 270;
Negative: 290)

?

-

-

-

-

+

+(Positive: 390;
Negative:170)
=30.36%

+(Positive: 409;
Negative:151)
=26.96%

+ (Positive: 391;
Negative:169)
= 30.18%

+(Positive: 390;
Negative: 170)
= 30.36%

-

+

+

-

-

?

Not Applicable

Not Applicable

+ (Positive: 458;
Negative: 102)
= 18.21%

+(Positive: 458;
Negative: 102)
= 18.21%

Expected
Sign

Table 6 shows that 30.36% of individual regressors (revenue receivables coefficient –ve
170) have negative values in the Jones Model and the overall coefficient is positive as
expected, whereas Jones (1991) found in 39% of the regressions the coefficient of change in
sales is negative. Similarly, the Modified Jones Model (1995) has 26.96% and the
Performance Matched Model(S.P. Kothari, et al., 2005) has 30.18% negative change in sales
coefficients. The Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model also shows 30.36% of sales
coefficients are negative, which is comparatively stronger than the Jones Model, Modified
Jones Model and Performance Matched Model. Property, plant and equipment were expecting
a negative coefficient, however, the Jones and Modified Jones Model both found positive
coefficients with accruals unlike the Performance Matched and Performance Matched Free
Cash Flow model. This change is a significant improvement in the Performance Matched Free
Cash Flow Model and evidenced that higher returns on assets generate higher income
changing accruals. The performance indicator coefficient, ROA, shows 18.21% of negative
individual regressors with positive coefficients, which indicates profit increasing accruals.
6.4 Multivariate Analysis
This section presents the results of multivariate regression for all the significant methods of
the study, including expected coefficient directions of variables. Jones’ Model is the pioneer
of accruals calculation, followed by the Modified Jones Model, where our analysis found that,
among all variables, the Modified Jones Model has more significant effects on NZX listing
tenure, business operating tenure and return on assets (ROA), with the R 2 value marginally
higher in the Modified Jones Model (20.6%) compared to the Jones Model (19.8%) for these
variables. The Fisher test shows both models are significant at a 1% level with acceptable
levels of Durbin-Watson value reflecting no auto correlation in the model. As a rule of thumb,
a Durbin-Watson test value lower than 2 is an acceptable level of auto correlation in the
model.
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Table 7
Multivariate Analysis of the Determinant of Discretionary Accruals
Variables
Constant
Regulation Dummy
Corporate Governance
Index
Corporate Governance
Index * Regulation
Dummy

0.015
(0.708)
-0.005
(.182)
-0.054
(-1.527)

Performance
Matched
Model
0.022
(0.197)
0.021
(0.861)
-0.038
(-1.178)

Performance
Matched Free Cash
Flow Model
0.147
(0.0828)
0.523
(2.501)**
-0.757
(-2.42)***

0.031
(0.688)

-0.033
(-0.769)

-0.701
(-1.800)*

Jones Model

Modified
Jones Model

0.006
(0.274)
0.004
(0.155)
-0.043
(-1.230)
0.020
(0.434)

-0.003
-0.005
-0.005
(-0.430)
(-0.760)
(-0.879)
0.001
0.001
0.001
Listing Tenure
(2.885)***
(2.456)**
(3.712)***
-0.001
-0.001
-0.001
Operating Tenure
(-3.012)***
(-2.905)***
(-5.70)***
0.006
-0.001
0.017
Leverage
(0.459)
(-0.038)
(1.338)
0.208
0.233
0.021
Return on Assets
(9.036)
(9.609)***
(1.178)
0.000
0.000
0.000
Total Assets (t-1)
(1.103)
(1.086)
(-0.250)
-0.004
-0.002
-0.018
Primary Sector Dummy
(-0.344)
(-0.179)
(-1.954)*
-0.004
-0.005
-0.006
Energy Sector Dummy
(-0.519)
(-0.643)
(-0.745)
0.003
-0.001
-0.027
Goods Sector Dummy
(0.246)
(-0.092)
(-2.199)**
-0.003
-0.004
-0.018
Property Sector Dummy
(-0.308)
(-0.398)
(-2.113)**
Investment Sector
-0.030
-0.028
-0.010
Dummy
(-2.299)
(-0.917)*
(-1.027)
R-squared
0.198
0.206
0.116
Adjusted R-squared
0.177
0.186
0.093
S.E. of regression
0.197
0.199
0.159
F-statistic
9.597
10.119
5.115
Prob(F-statistic)
0.000
0.000
0.000
Durbin-Watson stat
1.327
1.292
1.547
*, **, *** Correlation significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level (2-tailed)
Control Shareholder

0.360
(5.925)***
-0.005
(-2.300)**
0.005
(4.496)***
0.028
(0.257)
-0.588
(-3.878)***
0.000
(0.120)
0.454
(5.668)***
0.270
(3.158)***
0.315
(3.020)***
-0.025
(-0.289)
0.290
(2.884)**
0.171
0.149
1.429
8.000
0.000
1.711

Sample companies were categorised by 6 sectors, therefore 5 sector dummy variables
are used in analysis. Only the service sector has no dummy to avoid the dummy variable trap
which is the situation of perfect collinearity (Gujarati, 2003). In other words, ( ϕ1 ) represents
the intercept of the service sector and ϕ11 , ϕ12, ϕ13, ϕ14 , and ϕ15, are the differential intercept
coefficients reflecting the intercept of other sectors; Goods, Primary, Property, Energy and
Investment respectively.
Performance Matched Model regression found NZX listing tenure, Operating tenure,
Goods, Property and Energy sectors are statistically significant. This model has comparatively
lower R 2 with a predictive value of 11.6% at the 1% significance level. Moreover, a DurbinWatson test value of 1.547 indicates no auto correlation in the model.
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Finally, the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model shows relatively higher
significance of variables. Bradbury et al. (2006), in research about NZ firms found adjusted

R 2 = 0.075 to 0.089 at the 1% level of significance using different specifications of Modified
Jones Model (1995). The coefficient of regulation dummy for the Jones Model, Modified
Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model
is respectively 0.004, -0.005, 0.021 and 0.523. Of all the models, The Performance Matched
Free Cash Flow Model has significance at the 5% level with regulation. As mentioned above,
regulations have a positive impact on earnings management and H01 is not rejected for the
Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow
Model. However, the Modified Jones Model alone shows a negative coefficient. It indicates
that the existence of regulation reduces earnings management opportunity. In other words, a
more regulated company environment minimises the opportunistic management behaviour.
Firms with higher corporate governance compliance have reduced opportunistic
management attitudes which ensure higher accountability and reporting quality (Aguilera,
2005; Sinha, 2006). The coefficients of the corporate governance index for the Jones Model,
Modified Jones Model, Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash
Flow Model are -0.043, -0.054, -0.038 and -0.757 respectively. The entire set of coefficients
indicates a negative association of the corporate governance index with discretionary accruals;
indicating higher compliance of corporate governance reduces managerial accruals.
Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model has statistical significance at the 1% level. The
interaction coefficient of the corporate governance index and regulation dummy (Corporate
Governance Index * Regulation dummy) shows an expected negative association for both the
Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model as -0.033 and
-0.701 (at 10% level of significance); however, the Jones Model and Modified Jones Model
have positive coefficients of 0.020 and 0.031 with more than a 10% level of significance.
Compliant corporate governance ensures independent boards, audit processes and strong
internal control systems which reduce managerial discretion. H02 is thus rejected and
indicates that higher corporate governance compliance with regulation reduces discretionary
accruals. In summary, H01 and H02, results indicate that the existence of corporate
governance regulation alone does not reduce managerial opportunistic behaviour but
regulation with higher compliance of corporate governance does reduce managerial
discretion.
The coefficient for Control Shareholdings in the Performance Matched Free Cash
Flow Model is calculated as 0.360, statistically significant at a 1% level. However, the
coefficient for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Free Cash
Flow Model is calculated as -0.003, -0.005 and -0.005 respectively, at more than a 10% level
of statistical significance. The positive association of discretionary accruals and control
shareholdings is consistent with the rejection of H03, suggesting that concentrated ownership
holds significant control over management incurring discretionary accruals (Bradbury, et al.,
2006). Control shareholders have significant influence in selecting directors and CEOs of
firms which indirectly influences managerial discretion.
The coefficients of firm operating tenure for the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model,
Performance Matched Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Models are -0.001, 0.001, -0.001 and 0.005 respectively. Firm operating tenure is statistically significant at the
1% level for each of the models. Firms operating for longer terms having higher discretionary
accruals were supported in rejecting H04.
The coefficient of the Jones Model, Modified Jones Model, and Performance Matched
Models for listing tenure is 0.001 each while the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow
Models shows 0.005. Moreover, stock exchange listing tenure is statistically significant at a
5% level for both the Modified Jones Model and Performance Matched Free Cash Flow
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Model, and similarly, at a 1% level of significance for the Jones Model and Performance
Matched Model. As argued, stock exchange listing tenure has statistically significant negative
associations in the Performance Matched Model therefore H05 is rejected.
Performance indicator ROA has a negative coefficient of -0.588 for the Performance Matched
Free Cash Flow Model with 1% level significance and the Modified Jones Model has a
coefficient of 0.233 at that level. However, the Jones Model and Performance Matched Model
do not have any statistical significance with discretionary accruals. The negative association
indicates that high performance reduces managerial discretion: managers are still demotivated when they meet targeted performance. However, leverage and firm size do not
show any statistical significance at the 10% level.
Among NZX listed companies; primary, energy and goods sectors show statistical
significance at a 1% level in the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model. Similarly, the
Investment sector shows a 5% level of significance in the same Model. The Performance
Matched Model shows significance in the Primary sector at a 10% level; goods and property
sector returns at a 5% level of significance. The Modified Jones Model indicates a 10% level
of significance for the investment sector only. However, none of the sectors result in
statistical significance for the Jones Model. Therefore, compared with four measures of
discretionary accruals, the Performance Matched Free Cash Flow Model reflects more
significance in a sectoral analysis of managerial discretion. Finally, the existing interaction
between corporate governance and regulation suggests a negative coefficient, as expected.
This implies that existing regulations enhance corporate governance compliance that
subsequently reduces discretionary accruals.
7 Conclusions and Remarks
This paper expands the stream of earnings management model using discretionary accruals,
implementing free cash flow and documenting that firms demonstrating higher compliance of
corporate governance have relatively lower discretionary accruals. The free cash flow
measure is one of the very few observable inputs available in discretionary accruals models.
Earnings management literature evidenced that accruals models are suitable for explanation
using cash flow type operating activities.
The results depict corporate governance compliance increasing the accountability of
management and reducing financial discretion in decision making. Moreover, New Zealand
Stock Exchange listed companies are compelled to follow corporate governance regulation
and provide better monitoring of earnings with consequently lower discretionary accruals.
Discretionary accruals reduce relatively in growing firms and those in the initial stage of
operation. Managerial discretion reduces as corporate governance regulation compliance
improves and minimises discretionary accruals. This paper finds evidence consistent with the
proposition that firms complying with corporate governance regulation have more efficient
monitoring compared to low compliance firms.
An additional contribution of this paper is to determine that a regulated environment
of corporate governance reduces managerial opportunistic behaviour. Moreover, the evidence
shows the ‘comply or explain’ nature of soft regulation is effective in New Zealand and that it
reduces managerial discretionary accruals. The findings of this paper are beneficial for not
only New Zealand corporate governance legislators but for other countries in developing or
restoring corporate governance guidelines.
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